RELAP5/MOD3.3 Analyses of Core Heatup Prevention Strategy during Extended Station Blackout in PWR

Abstract

The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant demonstrated the vulnerability of the plants on the loss of electrical power for several days, so called extended station blackout (SBO). A set of measures have been proposed and implemented in response of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The purpose of the study was to investigate the application of the deterministic safety analysis for core heatup prevention strategy of the extended SBO in pressurized water reactor, lasting 72 h. The prevention strategy selected was water injection into steam generators using turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TD-AFW) or portable water injection pump. Method for assessment of the necessary pump injection flowrate is developed and presented. The necessary injection flowrate to the steam generators is determined from the calculated cumulative water mass injected by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump in the analysed scenarios, when desired normal level is maintained automatically. The developed method allows assessment of the necessary injection flowrates of pump, TD-AFW or portable, for different plant configurations and number of flowrate changes. The RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch04 computer code and input model of a two-loop pressurized water reactor is used for analyses, assuming different injection start times, flowrates and reactor coolant system losses. Three different reactor coolant system (RCS) coolant loss pathways, with corresponding leakage rate, can be expected in the pressurized water reactor (PWR) during the extended SBO: normal system leakage, reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and RCS coolant loss through letdown relief valve unless automatically isolated or until isolation is procedurally directed. Depressurization of RCS was also considered. In total, six types of RCS coolant loss scenarios were considered. Two cases were defined regarding the operation of the emergency diesel generators. Different delays of the pump injection start following the station blackout were assumed and analysed. For each scenario, two kinds of SBO calculations for two-loop PWR were performed, base and verification. Base calculations were needed to determine necessary minimum flowrate for steam generators feeding in such a way that they are not overfilled or emptied. Namely, it was assumed that instrumentation is not available during extended SBO. The verification calculations have been then performed to verify if the determined minimum flowrates are sufficient to prevent the core heatup. The calculated results show effectiveness of the proposed extended SBO prevention strategy provided that the water injection is available in the first two hours after SBO occurring at full power. If diesel generator is running after loss of offsite power for some time, e.g. one hour, the available time for steam generator water injection is significantly longer. The obtained results demonstrate the need for assessment of the pump injection flowrates before the utilization of the pump for mitigation of the event. The applicability of the developed method for assessment of the required pump injection flowrate has been validated on PWR.